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Abstract
We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining prob-
lems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically
given by asymmetric versions of the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we
view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy.
With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium
in this exchange economy. The utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles-
Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are
given by the standard traveling times of the two bargaining problems (see Perles-Maschler
(1981)).
Keywords: Bargaining Power, Perles-Maschler Solution, Equilibrium Model
JEL Classiﬁcation: C78, C62, D51, D63
We would like to thank Joachim Rosenm¨ uller and Walter Trockel for stimulating discussions and especially
an anonymous referee for many helpful comments on an earlier version. The paper was originated while the
authors were fellows of the research group “Procedural Approaches to Conﬂict Resolution” at the Center
for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), Bielefeld. We thank Paul W. Thurner for suggesting the problem
discussed in this paper. Haake acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the project “Fairness und Anreize”,
FiF-Projekt, Bielefeld University. Ervig acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the project “Procedural
Approaches to Conﬂict Resolution”, ZiF Bielefeld.1. Introduction 2
1 Introduction
The main idea in the paper evolved during various discussions about how negotiations
between two diﬀerent countries concerning separate issues take place and how solutions
are reached. Examples are subsidies for the agricultural sector or expenditures on environ-
mental projects. Not only delegates of a country are familiar with a frequently observed
principle: “You do me a favor here and I do you a favor there”. But does this method of
exchanging favors lead to a “desirable” solution? Our paper clearly answers this question
with yes. There are two main properties the ﬁnal solution should satisfy. First, it should
be Pareto optimal in the aggregate, i.e. there is no other package of subsidies and expen-
ditures that makes both countries better oﬀ. Second, if one compares the ﬁnal solution
with the scenario, in which both issues are treated separately, then neither of the countries
should be worse oﬀ in the ﬁnal solution. So the favor exchange really should do a favor
to both.
The latter property is known in economic theory as superadditivity. Perles & Maschler
(1981b) introduced a superadditive bargaining solution for two person bargaining games.
They discuss the symmetric version of the solution and brieﬂy point out how asymmetric
versions look like. Switching from the symmetric version to one asymmetric one can be
viewed as beneﬁtting some party. In view of this we can interpret “doing a favor” as
agreeing with application of a non-symmetric bargaining solution that favors the other.
In the paper we will introduce the term bargaining weight to quantify these beneﬁts. Then
“doing a favor” means shifting bargaining weight to the opponent.
Let us describe the idea of the paper more detailed now. The bargaining theoretic ap-
proach to ﬁnding an eﬃcient superadditive solution is to apply the Perles-Maschler (PM)
solution concept to the aggregate bargaining problem. In this version agents agree on the
solution concept and hence, on the ﬁnal solution. In the present paper we follow a dif-
ferent approach. We setup an exchange economy in which bargaining weights are traded.
We show that there always exists an equilibrium so that the equilibrium allocation (of
weights) is transformed to the PM solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Trans-
formation means that application of asymmetric PM solutions (with equilibrium weights)
yields the symmetric PM solution in the aggregate. In particular, we do not have to
compute the aggregate bargaining problem at all in order to determine the ﬁnal solution.
Equilibrium prices are given by primitives of the bargaining problems themselves. Hence,
in our approach the agents reach the same ﬁnal solution by individual utility maximiza-
tion. It turns out that superadditivity is the key property to achieve this result. No other2. Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation 3
bargaining solution can be “decentralized“ in this way.
There are few references in the literature concerning superadditive solutions in the bar-
gaining context. Deﬁnitely, one reason for this is that the superadditivity axiom (together
with the “usual” axioms) is incompatible with the presence of more than two players. A
counterexample is given in Perles (1982). However, Calvo & Gutherrez (1994) extend
the construction of the PM solution to n-person bargaining games, but their solution of
course loses the superadditivity property.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides the bargaining theoretic
framework and reviews the deﬁnition of the Perles-Maschler solution. In Section 3 the
basic model is introduced and discussed. Section 4 discusses the main results of the pa-
per on existence and uniqueness of equilibria in the exchange economy and the resulting
utility allocations in the aggregate bargaining problem. Examples are given in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation
An (axiomatic) bargaining problem for two persons is a pair V := (U,x) consisting of
a closed and convex set U ⊆ R2 describing feasible allocations of utilities and a vector
x ∈ U that reﬂects the agents’ utilities, when no agreement can be reached. Throughout
the paper we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1
For each bargaining problem V = (U,x) the set U is comprehensive (i.e. x ∈ U and
y ≤ x implies y ∈ U). The set of individual rational allocations Ux := {u ∈ U |u ≥ x}
is bounded (hence compact). Moreover, each U is generated by its individual rational
utility allocations, i.e. U = compH(Ux), where compH(·) denotes the comprehensive hull
operator.
Let Uc denote the class of bargaining problems that satisfy Assumption 1 and denote by Uc
0
the subclass in Uc that consists of bargaining problems having the common disagreement
point x = 0. W.l.o.g. we will restrict our analysis on the class Uc
0. There we can and will
identify V with U.
A mapping ϕ : Uc
0 −→ R2 is said to satisfy the symmetry axiom (SYM), if π(ϕ(U)) =
ϕ(π(U)) is satisﬁed for each U ∈ Uc
0 where π : R2 −→ R2 is the function that “changes2. Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation 4
coordinates”, i.e. π(x1,x2) := (x2,x1)1. Such a mapping ϕ is said to be covariant with
(aﬃne) linear transformations of utility (COV), if for each U ∈ Uc
0 and each (aﬃne)
linear function L : R2 −→ R2 of the form L(x) = (ρ1 x1,ρ2 x2) + d (ρ ∈ R2
++,d ∈ R2)
the condition ϕ(L(U)) = L(ϕ(U)) holds. Since the class Uc
0 is not invariant under aﬃne
transformations, we restrict transformations to be linear with positive coeﬃcients. But
the analysis in the paper is valid on Uc and aﬃne transformations.
A bargaining solution (b.s.) on Uc
0 is a mapping ϕ : Uc
0 −→ R2 such that for each
U ∈ Uc
0 the solution ϕ(U) is feasible (FEAS), individually rational (IR) and Pareto optimal
(PO) in U. Moreover, ϕ has to satisfy SYM and COV.
A bargaining solution ϕ on Uc
0 is said to be superadditive (SUPA), if it satisﬁes ϕ(U1)+
ϕ(U2) ≤ ϕ(U1 + U2) for any U1,U2 ∈ Uc
0.
It is well known that there is one and only one continuous2 bargaining solution µ : Uc → R2
that satisﬁes FEAS, PO, IR, COV, SYM and SUPA. This solution was introduced in Perles
& Maschler (1981b). We brieﬂy review its construction.3
We make use the following notation in the description of a bargaining problem. Fix
U ∈ Uc
0. Let τi(U) = τi := max{t|tei ∈ U} denote the maximal possible utility for agent
i among individual rational utility allocations.4 By ∂U we denote the Pareto boundary
of Ux. W.l.o.g. we will also assume that ∂U does not contain line segments parallel
to the axes. With such restrictions, we can describe ∂U as the graph of a function
C : [0,τ1] −→ R with C(t) := max{z ∈ R|(t,z) ∈ U}. Due to the convexity assumption
for bargaining problems the function C is continuous, strictly decreasing, concave and it
is diﬀerentiable at all but at most countably many points t ∈ [0,τ1]. For this reason, we
may use C0(·) to denote the ﬁrst derivative of C, taking into account that this is almost
everywhere well-deﬁned.
A parametrization of U is a continuous mapping x : [a,b] −→ ∂U with a,b ∈ R,a ≤ b
such that x(a) = (0,τ2),x(b) = (τ1,0) and x1(·) is non-decreasing (which implies x2(·) is
non-increasing).
The mapping C itself generates a canonic5 parametrization xC : [0,τ1] −→ R2 with
1Here π applied to a bargaining problem in Uc yields a bargaining problem in Uc with exchanged roles
of the agents.
2i.e. continuous with respect to the Hausdorﬀ topology on Uc
0
3see also Perles & Maschler (1981a), Peters (1992) or Rosenm¨ uller (2000)
4ei denotes the i-th unit vector in R2.
5One can equivalently describe ∂U by a concave function D : [0,τ2] −→ R2 and derive a corresponding
parametrization xD. The term “canonic” reﬂects a “natural” choice of the domain of the parametrization.2. Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation 5
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The Perles-Maschler bargaining solution µ on Uc
0 (hereafter PM solution) is now













Second, the PM solution is deﬁned by µ(U) := xC(¯ T(U)). In fact, µ is well deﬁned as it
does not depend on the parametrization used in (1) and (2) (for details see Rosenm¨ uller
(2000) or Perles & Maschler (1981b)).
The function f is continuous and strictly increasing, because the integrand is strictly
positive except for s = 0 (here C0(0) might be zero). Denote by ¯ b(U) = ¯ b := f(τ1)
the largest possible value that f attains. One can show that ¯ b does not depend on the
parametrization chosen in (1). Hence, f is a bijection from the interval [0,τ1] onto the
interval [0,¯ b]. By h := f−1 we denote its inverse mapping. With the mapping h and
the canonic parametrization xC, we get a new parametrization ξ : [0,¯ b] −→ R2 with
ξ := xC ◦ h. In fact, the mapping h : [0,¯ b] −→ [0,τ1] describes the transformation of
parameters when changing the parametrization from xC to ξ.
A straightforward computation now yields
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− ˙ ξ1(s) · ˙ ξ2(s) ds = ¯ b − ¯ T
and therefore obtain µ(U) = ξ(¯ b/2).
6In fact, we can take any parametrization.3. A Model for Bargaining Weights Exchange 6
Let us pause for an interpretation. As Perles & Maschler (1981b) argue one can view the
PM solution as follows. There are two particles moving along the Pareto frontier. We
will associate each particle with one player. Player 1’s particle starts at (0,τ2) whereas
player 2’s particle starts at (τ1,0). The interval [0,¯ b] reﬂects time. They “move” on the
boundary according to the parametrization ξ, i.e. the product of coordinate velocities
equals −1. In view of this, we detect ¯ b(U) as the time needed to traverse the whole
boundary. We therefore call ¯ b the standard traveling time. Hence, after time s ∈ [0,¯ b]
player 1’s particle is located at ξ(s), whereas player 2’s particle stands at ξ(¯ b − s). At
time ¯ b/2 the two particles meet at the PM solution.
3 A Model for Bargaining Weights Exchange
In this section we will discuss the basic model. Suppose there are two agents being en-
gaged in two (diﬀerent) bargaining problems UA and UB ∈ Uc
0. An agreement consists of a
pair (uA,uB) ∈ UA×UB specifying a utility allocation for each of the bargaining problems
separately. We assume that utility scales are chosen in a way that does not only allow
interpersonal utility comparison but also enables us to compute an agent’s total utility by
adding his utilities in UA and UB. This additivity constraint is in fact a hard condition
to satisfy in certain contexts. It is necessary that there are no correlations between UA
and UB. Therefore, an agent may evaluate an agreement by aggregating (“adding up”)
his valuations of uA and uB. In view of the covariance axiom for bargaining solutions,
which enables us to (linearly) rescale the axes, this condition loses a lot of its restrictive
face.
Alternatively, one can think of a model with uncertainty. There are two bargaining prob-
lems from which one will be chosen at random. In order to employ expected utility theory,
one has to be able to compare utilities across bargaining problems. Then the superaddi-
tivity axiom guarantees that for both agents the expected bargaining solution w.r.t UA
and UB is not greater than the bargaining solution of the expected bargaining problem.
The main problem, however, is that in general an agreement is not eﬃcient w.r.t. the
aggregate bargaining problem, which is given by the sum U = UA + UB. A ﬁrst (naive)
approach from bargaining theory would be the following. One computes the sum of the
bargaining problems, and applies some bargaining solution ϕ to U which automatically
determines some agreement (uA,uB) that fulﬁlls uA + uB = ϕ(UA + UB). Of course,
this ﬁnal agreement should be compared with the utility allocations ϕ(UA) and ϕ(UB),3. A Model for Bargaining Weights Exchange 7
respectively. In case that ϕ is not superadditive, then in the ﬁnal agreement one of the
agents could be worse oﬀ in both bargaining problems compared to what ϕ dictates.
Yet, does this “procedure” to achieve eﬃciency reﬂects what happens in real conﬂicts?
We often observe that agents start with an eﬃcient focal point in each of the bargaining
problems (e.g. they start with µ(UA) and µ(UB)) and then deviate from this by favoring
one agent in situation A and the other in situation B. The idea of our model is to engage
a “Walrasian mechanism” to ensure eﬃciency. For this we construct an exchange econ-
omy, in which, roughly speaking, bargaining power is traded and initial endowments are
determined by the PM solution in A and B, respectively.
We keep the notation from the previous section and attach superscripts A and B to distin-
guish the quantities in the referring bargaining problems. With the standard parametriza-
tions ξA,ξB we could interpret the quantities ¯ bA and ¯ bB as the time a particle needs to
move from (0,τA
2 ) to (τA
1 ,0) (or the other way round), when the law of motion is deter-
mined by (3). Starting with the PM solution corresponds to letting each agent’s particle
move half of the standard traveling time in each problem. We will now let agents trade
fractions of these traveling times. For this, consider functions wA,wB : [0,1] −→ R2 with
w
A
1 (α) := ξ
A





2 (α) := ξ
A
2 ((1 − α) ·¯ b
A) = C
A(h




1 (β) := ξ
B





2 (β) := ξ
B
2 ((1 − β) ·¯ b
B) = C
B(h
B((1 − β) ·¯ b
B))
For example, the quantity wA
1 (α) denotes the utility that agent 1 obtains in A, if he were
allowed to “move his particle” from (0,τ2(UA)) according to ξA for α ·¯ bA (units of time).
Analogously, wA
2 (α) reﬂects agent 2’s utility, if he were allowed to travel α · ¯ bA units of
time. By straightforward computations, the point on ∂UA that agent 2’s particle reaches
is exactly the point, where agent 1’s particle would be after (1 − α) ·¯ bA time units.
Lemma 1
The functions wK
i (K = A,B , i = 1,2) are strictly increasing and concave. If CK(K =
A,B) is strictly concave then so is wK
i (i = 1,2).
Proof:
We drop superscripts A,B for simpliﬁcation and assume ﬁrst that the function C is twice



















−C0(h(s)))4 ≤ 0. (s ∈ (0,¯ b)) (5)3. A Model for Bargaining Weights Exchange 8
(use derivatives of the function f and observe that C0(t) < 0 for t > 0). This means
that ξ1 is strictly increasing (ﬁrst derivative in (4) may not be deﬁned for h(s) = 0) and
concave. In view of (5) the function ξ1 is strictly concave, if and only if C is strictly
concave.














≤ 0 (s ∈ (0,¯ b)) (7)
Hence, ξ2 is strictly decreasing and concave. As above, it is strictly concave if and only if
C is strictly concave. Since the mappings w1 and w2 are compositions of ξ1 and ξ2 with
linear transformations of the unit interval, they are also (strictly) concave. w1 and w2
are strictly increasing as the derivative of the linear function α 7→ (1−α)·¯ b has negative
derivative.
A re-inspection of (4) and (5) reveals that the diﬀerentiability assumptions are in fact
not needed. The ﬁrst derivative of ξ1 exists at all but at most countably many points in
[0,¯ b]. With (strict) monotonicity of C0 we get (strict) monotonicity of h0, which implies
the desired concavity property. 2
Two remarks are in order:
1) It may appear slightly dubious to express the multi-faceted notion of bargaining power
by a simple parameter α ∈ [0,1]. However, we do not want to characterize bargaining
power itself, but to describe the eﬀects of “exerting bargaining power α”. And these
eﬀects should be described by the utility allocation resulting in a speciﬁc bargaining
problem. Hence, we can formally describe the eﬀects of bargaining power by a mapping
P : Uc
0 × [0,1] −→ R2 that assigns to each bargaining problem U and each bargaining
weight α (of agent 1) a utility allocation P(U,α). Generally, there are two kinds of plausi-
ble properties that P should satisfy. First, conditions for a ﬁxed bargaining problem and
varying weight, and second, conditions for ﬁxed weight and varying bargaining problems.
Thereby, we think of the following conditions: For ﬁxed bargaining problem the mapping
P1(U,·) should be strictly increasing (i.e. a gain of power should always pay oﬀ), normal-
ized (i.e. P1(U,0) = 0, “no power yields no utility”) and concave (the additional gain of
utility from an additional small unit of power should decrease with the amount of power
the agent already possesses). For ﬁxed weight α we want to require the “usual” regu-
larity conditions, such as covariance with (aﬃne) linear transformations and in addition
superadditivity. This means in eﬀect we require P(·,α) to be an (asymmetric) bargaining3. A Model for Bargaining Weights Exchange 9
solution.
Lemma 1 shows that all these natural conditions are satisﬁed by our formal notion of
bargaining weight. Set for example P(UA,α) = ξA(α¯ bA) = (wA
1 (α),wA
2 (1 − α)). Con-
versely, Perles & Maschler (1981a, Thm 5.1) state that any weight function exhibiting
these properties (monotonicity, concavity, superadditivity) is essentially of the above de-
scribed form. Therefore, we could as well start with these properties for weight functions
and end up with our construction. In this spirit, we view this as a justiﬁcation to speak
of a parameter α to represent (agent 1’s) bargaining weight in UA.
2) Perles & Maschler (1981b) provide an economic interpretation of the “law of motion”,
according to which the two particles move along the Pareto boundary (see also Calvo &
Gutherrez (1994)). Their idea can be described in the present context roughly as follows.





Linearizing ﬁrst derivatives, this is roughly
w1(α+ε)−w1(α)
w1(1−α−ε)−w1(1−α) for small ε > 0. Thus, the
numerator is agent 1’s utility gain from an extra ε of power, whereas the denominator
reﬂects his utility loss, when having weight 1 − α and losing ε. Hence the denominator
describes his utility loss, when agent 2’s bargaining weight were α and he gets an extra
ε. Then the law of motion incorporated in eq. (3) requires such ratios of utility gain and
loss to be equal, i.e.
utility gain for 1












utility gain for 2
utility loss for 2
has to be satisﬁed at each α ∈ [0,1].
With this interpretation in mind, we will now set up an exchange economy in which such
bargaining weights can be traded. Formally, it is described by a tuple
(8) E = E
UA,UB
:= ([0,1] × [0,1],u1,u2,ω1,ω2),
where [0,1]2 reﬂects the commodity space for the two “commodities” bargaining power in
A and B. As mentioned in the introduction of this section, utility functions are determined
by adding utilities in the two bargaining problems, which means
ui(α,β) := w
A
i (α) + w
B
i (β) (i = 1,2).







Note that the initial utility allocation is
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Thus, initial utilities are given by the sum of PM solutions in the two underlying bargain-
ing problems.
Lemma 2
For each agent i the utility function ui is concave and strictly increasing. If both bargain-
ing problems UA,UB are described by strictly concave functions CA and CB, then ui is
strictly concave.
Proof:
With the (strict) concavity of wA
i and wB
i (i = 1,2) one immediately obtains (strict)
concavity of the utility functions u1 and u2, respectively. Use Lemma 1 to complete the
proof. 2
The superadditivity property will drive our results in two ways: First, as Perles & Maschler
(1981a, Thm.5.1) show, for a ﬁxed weight ¯ α the mapping ξ·(¯ α) : Uc
0 −→ R2 is a (non-
symmetric) superadditive bargaining solution. Therefore, by Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain
concave utility functions and existence of Walrasian equilibria in E.7 By the First Welfare
Theorem equilibrium allocations are Pareto eﬃcient. In fact, the set of Pareto eﬃcient
allocations in E is mapped via (u1,u2) onto the set of Pareto eﬃcient utility allocations in
U. Second, superadditivity ensures that neither agent will lose when going to the solution
of the aggregate problem. Therefore, the allocation of weights that corresponds to µ(U)
is located in the Core of E. With non-superadditive bargaining solutions this relation
cannot be established. Note that any Walrasian equilibrium is also located in the Core.
Our goal in the next section is to show that there is always a particular equilibrium in
E that corresponds to the PM solution µ(U) of the aggregate bargaining problem. This
means that the PM solution is achievable by “decentralized trading of weights”.
4 Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution
Before we start equilibrium analysis in E, we will need a couple of technical lemmas on
the connection between standard traveling times and aggregation of bargaining problems.
The following lemma is proved in Perles & Maschler (1981b, Cor.4.10).
7We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that superadditivity is not a necessary condition to
establish existence of equilibria.4. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 11
Lemma 3
The function ¯ b : Uc
0 −→ R that assigns to each bargaining problem its standard traveling
time is additive on Uc
0.
Lemma 4 is a well known result on eﬃcient points in aggregate bargaining problems.
Lemma 4
A utility allocation z ∈ U is Pareto eﬃcient (z ∈ ∂U), if and only if there exist points
zA ∈ ∂UA and zB ∈ ∂UB satisfying
z = z
A + z
B, NCU(z) ∩ NCUA(z
A) ∩ NCUB(z
B) 6= ∅,
where NCU(z) denotes the set of supporting normal vectors at z ∈ ∂U.
For z = (z1,z2) ∈ ∂U deﬁne T l




U,z,0)) the truncated bargaining problem of U in direction of the ﬁrst
(second) axis.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together yield a helpful connection between traveling times and eﬃcient
points.
Lemma 5
Suppose zA = (zA
1 ,zA
2 ) ∈ ∂UA and zB = (zB
1 ,zB
2 ) ∈ ∂UB are such that NCUA(zA) ∩
NCUB(zB) 6= ∅ (which guarantees zA + zB ∈ ∂U).
1. For l = 1,2 we have T l
UA,zA + T l
UB,zB = T l
U,zA+zB.
2. Let sA,sB be determined by ξA(sA) = zA,ξB(sB) = zB. Then ¯ b(T 2
U,zA+zB) = sA+sB
holds true.
3. Denote by s the corresponding traveling time for zA + zB, i.e. ξ(s) = zA + zB =
ξA(sA) + ξB(sB). Then we have s = sA + sB.
Proof:
To prove 1) use concavity of the functions CA and CB, which in particular means de-
creasing ﬁrst derivatives. Then assertions 2) and 3) are a direct consequence of 1) and
Lemma 3. 24. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 12
Now, let z = (z1,z2) ∈ ∂U be Pareto eﬃcient in U and s ∈ [0,¯ b] with ξ(s) := z. From the
construction of aggregate bargaining problems we know that z2 can be expressed as the
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First order conditions (in the diﬀerentiable case) require CA0(hA(sA)) = CB0(hB(sB)).
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Analogously for z1 we have
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A],s






In particular, the coordinates of the PM solution µ(U) are obtained from (10) and (11)











A ∈ [0,¯ b
A],s








Roughly speaking, the PM solution is obtained by eﬃciently splitting a total traveling
time of ¯ b/2 in traveling times sA and sB in A and B.
Coming back to the exchange economy Lemma 4 has the following direct implication.
Lemma 6




2 (1 − α)

,
which implies hA(α¯ bA) = wA
1 (α) (analogously in situation B). Then the two derived util-
ity allocations have a common normal vector, i.e. NCUA(ξA(α¯ bA))∩NCUB(ξB(β¯ bB)) 6= ∅.
Thus, in the diﬀerentiable case (and 0 < α,β < 1) the equation CA0(hA(α¯ bA)) =
CB0(hB(β¯ bB)) holds.
Proof:
Suppose to the contrary that α0,β0 are such that the referring utility allocations in UA and4. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 13
UB do not have a common normal vector, i.e. NCUA(ξA(α0¯ bA)) ∩ NCUB(ξB(β0¯ bB)) = ∅.
By Lemma 4 this means that the sum ξA(α0¯ bA)) + ξB(β0¯ b) is not located in ∂U, i.e. it
is not eﬃcient. Hence, there exists z ∈ ∂U that dominates this sum. Again, by use of
Lemma 4 there exist zA ∈ ∂UA and zB ∈ ∂UB with NCUA(zA) ∩ NCUB(zB) 6= ∅ and
zA + zB = z. Let α,β now be deﬁned to satisfy ξA(α¯ bA) = zA and ξB(β¯ bB) = zB. Then
(u1(α,β),u2(1−α,1−β)) = zA+zB ≥ ξA(α0¯ bA))+ξB(β0¯ b) = (u1(α0,β0),u2(1−α0,1−β0))
shows that ((α0,β0);(1 − α0,1 − β0)) is not eﬃcient and the lemma is proved. 2
Next, we address the question how equilibrium prices in E look like? For this, we look at
agent 1’s utility maximization problem. Suppose u1,u2 are diﬀerentiable. Note that for












( − CA0(hA(α ·¯ bA)))
.
Furthermore, we know that in an equilibrium ((¯ α, ¯ β;1− ¯ α,1− ¯ β), ¯ p1, ¯ p2) we have that the
allocation is eﬃcient and therefore (u1(¯ α, ¯ β),u2(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β)) is located in ∂U.
In the diﬀerentiable case8 we can achieve a result on equilibrium prices.
Theorem 1
Let E be an exchange economy as in (8) with diﬀerentiable utility functions u1,u2. Then
there exists a Walrasian equilibrium with equilibrium prices (¯ p1, ¯ p2) that satisfy ¯ p1/¯ p2 =
¯ bA/¯ bB.
Proof:
We assume diﬀerentiability of CA and CB. For prices p1 (for a unit of “power” in A) and





∂α (¯ α, ¯ β)
∂u1












¯ p1 · α + ¯ p2 · β =
1
2
· (¯ p1 + ¯ p2) (14)
(the last equation in (13) holds due to Lemma 6). 2
8In the non-diﬀerentiable case the assertions have to be properly adjusted.4. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 14
An inspection of agent 1’s demand in an equilibrium for the two commodities with equi-




u1(α,β)| ¯ p1 α + ¯ p2 β =
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B
1 (β)|¯ b
A α +¯ b
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B(β ·¯ b
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This means in view of (12) that given equilibrium prices as above agent 1 has to solve
exactly the same maximization problem that also generates his coordinate of the PM
solution. With similar considerations one obtains the same result for agent 2.
This establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 2
Let E be an exchange economy as in (8). Then there is an equilibrium ((¯ α, ¯ β);(1 −
¯ α,1 − ¯ β), ¯ p1, ¯ p2) with equilibrium prices (¯ p1, ¯ p2) = (¯ bA,¯ bB) and the utility allocation
in equilibrium coincides with the Perles-Maschler solution of the aggregate bargaining
problem, i.e.
u1(¯ α, ¯ β) = µ1(U), u2(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β) = µ2(U).
Theorem 2 guarantees that the PM solution is achieved in some equilibrium with equilib-
rium prices that reﬂect the diﬀerent traveling times. But still, there may be a large set
of equilibrium prices. We shift the uniqueness question to the end of this section.
Next, we will have a closer look at Pareto eﬃcient allocations and supporting prices.
Due to concavity and monotonicity of utility functions the Second Fundamental Welfare
Theorem applies to our exchange economy and therefore any eﬃcient allocation can be
described as an equilibrium with transfers (e.g. of initial endowments). Lemma 6 gives a
necessary condition for eﬃcient allocations in E. In Theorem 1 this was exploited to show
that the traveling times ¯ bA and ¯ bB in fact determine equilibrium prices. A re-inspection
of the proof reveals that traveling times also determine supporting prices for arbitrary
eﬃcient allocations.4. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 15
Lemma 7
Let U ∈ Uc
0 be a bargaining problem and λ = (λ1,λ2) ∈ R2
+ be a normal vector at U
in (¯ t,C(¯ t)), i.e. λ ∈ NCU(¯ t,C(¯ t)). Let ¯ s be the corresponding traveling time, which









is a normal vector for w1(·) at ¯ α. To be precise, we assert
λ(¯ t,C(¯ t)) ≥ λ(t,C(t)) (t ∈ [0,τ1]) implies λ
0 (¯ α,w1(¯ α)) ≥ λ
0 (α,w1(α)) (α ∈ [0,1]).
Proof:
Fix ¯ t ∈ [0,τ1]. Since λ is a supporting normal vector at (¯ t,C(¯ t)) one immediately concludes
that
(16) λ2 · (−C
0





%(¯ t)) denotes the left-hand (right-hand) ﬁrst derivative of C at ¯ t.
Due to concavity of the function C, the left inequality is valid for all r ≥ ¯ t instead of
¯ t, whereas the right inequality is valid for all r ≤ ¯ t. Taking appropriate integrals over




















−C0(r)dr (t ≤ ¯ t),
which is translated to
(17)
p
λ1(t − ¯ t) ≤
p
λ2(f(t) − f(¯ t)) (t ∈ [0,τ1]).
Since the mapping h is a bijection from [0,¯ b] onto [0,τ1], inequality (17) can be rewritten
as
p
λ1(h(s) − h(¯ s)) ≤
p
λ2 (f(h(s)) − f(h(¯ s))) (s ∈ [0,¯ b])
p
λ2(s − ¯ s) ≥
p
λ1(h(s) − h(¯ s)) (s ∈ [0,¯ b])
p
λ2(α¯ b − ¯ α¯ b) ≥
p
λ1(h(α¯ b) − h(¯ α¯ b)) (α ∈ [0,1])
¯ b
p
λ2(α − ¯ α) ≥
p
















(α,w1(α)) (α ∈ [0,1])








is in fact a supporting normal vector
for w1 at ¯ α and the lemma is proved. 24. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 16
Lemma 7 now enables us to derive supporting prices at an eﬃcient allocation ((¯ α, ¯ β);(1−
¯ α,1− ¯ β) in the Edgeworth box. By Lemma 6 we know that the two corresponding utility
allocations ξA(¯ α¯ bA) ∈ UA and ξB(¯ β¯ bB) ∈ UB have a common normal vector, say λ. From















































(β ∈ [0,1]). (19)






































u1(α,β) − u1(¯ α, ¯ β)

(α,β ∈ [0,1]). (20)
Inequality (20) now gives us the desired implication. Whenever agent 1 thinks the bundle
(α,β) is at least as good as the “eﬃcient bundle” (¯ α, ¯ β), then the right hand side in (20)
is not negative. This implies that the left hand side has to be non-negative and therefore
the value of (¯ α, ¯ β) under prices (¯ bA,¯ bB) does not exceed the value of (α,β).
For agent 2 we get the analogous condition to (18) and (19) by interchanging λ1 and λ2.
















u2(α,β) − u2(¯ α, ¯ β)

(α,β ∈ [0,1]). (21)
This establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 3
Let ((¯ α, ¯ β);(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β)) be an eﬃcient allocation in E. Denote by KA (KB) the set
of normal vectors supporting the respective utility allocations in UA and UB, i.e. KA :=
NCUA(ξA(¯ α¯ bA)) (KB := NCUB(ξB(¯ β¯ bB))). Then the following statements hold:
1. The set of price vectors supporting u1 at (¯ α, ¯ β) is given by
Su1(¯ α, ¯ β) :=













Analogously, the set of price vectors supporting u2 at (1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β) is given by
Su2(1−¯ α,1−¯ β) :=














Then the set of price vectors supporting the eﬃcient allocation ((¯ α, ¯ β);(1−¯ α,1− ¯ β))
is given by the intersection Su1(¯ α, ¯ β) ∩ Su2(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β).4. Walrasian Equilibria and the PM Solution 17
2. In particular, the price system (¯ bA,¯ bB) is a supporting price system for any eﬃcient
allocation in E.
Proof:
In order to determine subgradients of u1, consider inequality (18) with η ∈ KA instead of




































































u1(α,β) − u1(¯ α, ¯ β)

(α,β ∈ [0,1]).
This shows the support property for u1 at (¯ α, ¯ β). With analogous arguments and use of
(21) we get the assertion for u2.




(and hence the vector
 ¯ bA,¯ bB
) is located in Su1(¯ α, ¯ β)∩Su2(1− ¯ α,1− ¯ β).
2
Theorem 3 oﬀers an extension of our results. It says that independent of the initial
allocation, the price vector ( ¯ bA,¯ bB) is always an equilibrium price vector. Moreover, as
with symmetric endowments, both agents are better oﬀ in equilibrium, compared to the
initial endowment. But now, all the desired properties (eﬃciency and superadditivity)
are fulﬁlled.
We close the section with two suﬃcient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium.
Corollary 1
Let E be an exchange economy as in (8). Assume that the functions CA and CB are
diﬀerentiable. Let ((¯ α, ¯ β);(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β)) be an eﬃcient allocation with 0 < ¯ α, ¯ β < 1.
Then
 ¯ bA,¯ bB
is (up to normalization) the unique price vector supporting this allocation.
Proof:
Diﬀerentiability, eﬃciency and the non-boundary assumption together imply
NCUA(ξA(¯ α¯ bA)) = NCUB(ξB(¯ α¯ bB)) =: {q λ|q ∈ R++}. From Theorem 3 it follows
Su1(¯ α, ¯ β) = Su2(1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β) =

r(¯ bA,¯ bB)|r ∈ R++
	
, which proves the corollary. 25. Examples 18
Corollary 2
Let E be an exchange economy as in (8). Assume that the functions CA and CB are




















Then equilibrium prices are (up to normalization) uniquely determined by ¯ p1/¯ p2 = ¯ bA/¯ bB.
Moreover, if CA and CB are strictly concave, then there exists exactly one equilibrium in E.
Proof:
Condition (22) guarantees that the only eﬃcient allocations, in which at least one of the
weights is zero are those with either (¯ α, ¯ β) = (0,0) or (¯ α, ¯ β) = (1,1). But neither of these
allocations can form an equilibrium. Thus, we are in the situation of Corollary 1 and
therefore all eﬃcient allocations are supported by a unique price vector. This establishes
uniqueness of equilibrium prices. In case that CA and CB are strictly concave functions
we know by Lemma 2 that utility functions u1 and u2 are strictly concave and therefore
each agent’s demand correspondence is single-valued, which implies that in this case there
is exactly one equilibrium allocation. 2
5 Examples
Example 1 (Non-diﬀerentiable case)
Consider the following setup:
C






8 t , 0 ≤ t ≤ 8
18 − 2t , 8 < t ≤ 9
C
B : [0,2] −→ R, C
B(t) := 2 − t.














Figure 1 illustrates the two bargaining problems and the aggregated one.











































































































Figure 1: Bargaining Problems in Example 1











2 s + 6 ,
√












B(s) = s, ξ
B(s) = (s,2 − s),
from which we can easily compute the PM solutions of UA and UB. We simply eval-
uate µ(UA) = ξA(3
2
√
2) = (6, 9
4) and µ(UB) = ξB(1) = (1,1). As one immediately



















8(α¯ bA) = 12α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
1 √
2 (α¯ bA) + 6 = 3α + 6 , 2







6α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
3
3
2 α + 3
2 , 1
3 < α ≤ 1
w
B
1 (β) = 2β, w
B
2 (β) = 2β.





12α + 2β , 0 ≤ α ≤ 2
3
3α + 6 + 2β , 2





6α + 2β , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
3
3
2 α + 3
2 + 2β , 1
3 < α ≤ 1.
Thus, the exchange economy E (cf. (8)) is completely deﬁned. Figure 2 illustrates utility
functions in the corresponding Edgeworth box. The solid lines represent agent 1’s indif-
ference curves, whereas dashed lines describe agent 2’s indiﬀerence curves. The shaded

















































































































Figure 2: Edgeworth Box for Example 1
multiple equilibria in this exchange economy. If we computed the speciﬁc one with prices
(¯ p1, ¯ p2) = (3
√
2,2), we get a unique equilibrium allocation, which is (¯ α, ¯ β;1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β)
with ¯ α = 2
3 and ¯ β = 1
4 (2 −
√
2) (cf. Figure 2). The utility allocation in this equilibrium










, which is indeed the PM solution
of the aggregate bargaining problem U. 2
Example 2
We now consider an example with strictly concave functions CA and CB. The are given
by
C
A : [0,2] −→ R, C
A(t) := 4 − t
2, C
























































































Figure 3: Bargaining Problems in Example 36. Concluding Remarks 21



























































































































































Figure 4: Edgeworth Box for Example 2
tion. Indeed, the equilibrium are according to Theorem 1 given by the standard traveling
times. The equilibrium ((¯ α, ¯ β;1 − ¯ α,1 − ¯ β), ¯ p1, ¯ p2) is given by
¯ α ≈ 0.3494, ¯ β ≈ 0.6129, ¯ p1 =
8
3
, ¯ p2 = 2. 2
6 Concluding Remarks
One may as well think of other bargaining solutions and their asymmetric versions to
get a similar construction for bargaining power. Yet, it turns out that even if the weight
functions w· have the desired properties, the ﬁnal solution (of the aggregate), loosely
speaking, does not have to be in the Core of the exchange economy. Hence, it cannot be
established by an equilibrium.6. Concluding Remarks 22
The most frequently used class of asymmetric bargaining solutions is the class of Nash
solutions. With an (asymmetric) Nash solution, weight functions may fail to be strictly
increasing or to be concave. As a result, preferences in the Edgeworth box may no longer
be convex and hence existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed. However, in view
of the present model, the superadditivity axiom oﬀers the most “natural” property: it
provides an incentive for both agents to consider all bargaining problems simultaneously.
Some readers may feel uncomfortable with a seemingly conﬂicting mixture of cardinal
and ordinal solution concepts. Indeed, as soon as we enter the Edgeworth box and apply
the Walrasian equilibrium concept, we are no longer in a cardinal context. Yet, we view
this way as a tool to come up with a certain allocation of bargaining power. And exactly
this allocation is meant to “execute” the utilities, i.e. to determine the solution in the
cardinal context. Note that agents’ preferences in the Edgeworth box are not touched by
the right transformations of the two bargaining problems. If we apply the same linear
transformation to both bargaining problems, then the agents’ utility functions will be
linearly transformed and hence preferences will be preserved.9
The work in the paper can be extended in a couple of directions. First, the class of bar-
gaining problems under consideration can be extended from Uc
0 to Uc without substantial
change of the results. This is as unproblematic as allowing boundaries of utility possibility
sets to contain line segments that are parallel to some axis. Finally, there is nothing spe-
cial with the fact that we consider two bargaining problems. With analogous arguments
as used in the paper, one can consider the model with ﬁnitely many bargaining situations.
Also note from Theorem 3 it follows that the results can easily be modiﬁed for asymmetric
versions of the PM solution as well. If one starts with an identical but not equal initial
endowment of weights in UA and UB, one obtains an equilibrium that corresponds to the
asymmetric PM solution w.r.t. the starting weights. The straightforward details are left
to the reader.
Since there is no superadditive bargaining solution for more than two persons (see Perles
(1982)), we cannot hope for a straightforward extension of our model to the n-person
case. Whether or not the extension of the PM solution to n-person bargaining prob-
lems can be used to deﬁne a notion of bargaining power is an open problem. But the
lack of superadditivity may be an insurmountable obstacle for the process of ﬁnding an
agreement.
9Application of diﬀerent linear transformations to the bargaining problems should not be allowed,
because this would violate our assumption that an agent’s overall utility is the sum of utilities he gets in
the two bargaining problems.References 23
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